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Substantive Due Process Challenges: Are They 
Creeping into Education under a New Standard of 
Review? 
Traditionally, courts have accorded educational institutions great 
deference in educational decisions made by the appropriate authorities. 1 
However, in recent years, challenges to educational practices2 have be-
come more frequent and substantive due process attacks have been in-
creasingly used in those challenges. 3 Despite the great number of sub-
stantive due process attacks, the Supreme Court has yet to determine 
whether "courts can review academic decisions of public educational 
institutions under a substantive due process standard."4 Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Court in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,~'> 
1. Cf Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 516 (1985) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). For a discussion of the facts in Ewing, see infra text accompanying notes 45-48. 
2. In the context of this article, the term "educational practices" is used to describe the deci-
sions, practices and laws under which the daily activities of educational institutions operate. For 
the purposes of this article, only public educational institutions are considered, but included are 
primary, secondary, and higher educational institutions. Examples of educational practices in-
clude: the decision to expel a student; the decision not to graduate a student; the decision not to 
rehire a teacher; decisions about curriculum content; and general administrative decisions such as 
school boundaries; teacher assignments, etc. 
3. Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964) (generally considered by most com-
mentators to have been the watershed case in establishing the doctrine of substantive due process 
as a protection for fundamental rights), there were very few challenges to educational practices 
using explicit substantive due process attacks. Since Griswold, there have been 344 challenges to 
educational practices using substantive due process. These challenges have involved cases regard-
ing student dismissals, student discipline, faculty dismissals, and curriculum decisions. 
(WESTLAW, MED-CS, ALLFEDS databases). 
A typical substantive due process challenge to an educational practice usually involves a situa-
tion where a student or a teacher has a grievance with an administrative decision but has been 
given a chance to air those grievance in some sort of hearing. Because the plaintiff in these cases 
has been granted procedural guarantees, the plaintiff is left to argue that the underlying educa-
tional practice is fundamentally unfair. The argument is made that the educational practice was so 
fundamentally unfair that it rises to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right under the 
due process clause. This challenge to the substance or content of the action is made under the 
doctrine of substantive due process. See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. 
Education administrators are especially vehement in their concern over instances of judicial 
intervention in what they perceive as "their business." Educators often find that nowhere is "their 
business" more "their business" than in policies and decisions about grades, program completion, 
and diplomas. Substantive due process challenges pose an especially significant threat of judicial 
intrusion because substantive due process analysis goes to the substance of the educational deci-
sions, not just the procedure of those decisions as procedural due process. 
4. Ewing, 106 S.Ct. at 511-12. 
5. 106 S.Ct. 507 (1985). 
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assumed that such a standard of review existed, but stated that the issue 
had not been decided. 6 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, vehe-
mently disagreed with this assumption and decried the idea of creating 
a different standard of review under substantive due process for educa-
tion cases. 7 
This article looks at the standard of review in recent substantive 
due process cases which evaluate educational practices. The article con-
cludes that lower courts are developing a slightly different standard of 
review for substantive due process challenges to educational practices. 
This new standard of review is more demanding than the plausible 
rational basis requirement found in most substantive due process cases 
that deal with non-fundamental interests;8 however, this standard is 
much less stringent than strict judicial scrutiny under the compelling 
state interest test used in fundamental right analysis.9 This standard of 
review may be a "rational educational basis'' standard, rather than a 
traditional "rational basis" standard. The difference between the stan-
dards is that the "rational educational basis" standard looks at the con-
tent of the educational practice, whereas the traditional "rational basis" 
standard looks at the relationship between the practice and a legitimate 
state interest. 10 
Part I of this article briefly looks at the traditional standard of 
review under a substantive due process challenge as it relates to educa-
tional practices. 11 Part II explores the standard of review which the 
6. /d. at 511-12. 
7. In the context of liberty interests, this Court has been careful to examine each as-
serted interest to determine whether it 'merits' the protection of substantive due process. 
I do not think the [education interest] entitles it to join those other, far more 
important interests that have heretofore been accorded the protection of substantive due 
process. 
/d. at 515-16 (Powell, J., concurring). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
9. When the Supreme Court uses strict judicial scrutiny in fundamental rights cases they 
employ the "compelling state interest test." In other words, when strict scrutiny is used, the state 
must have a compelling interest (or reason) for infringing on a protected right, not just a legiti-
mate interest. Sometimes, the terms "strict judicial scrutiny" and "compelling state interest" are 
used interchangeably. See infra text accompanying notes 18-22. 
10. There is a subtle difference between the traditional rational basis test enunciated in such 
cases as Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and the "rational educational basis" 
test which this article suggests exists. The main difference between the two standards is that the 
latter examines the rationality of the content of the educational practice, while the former does 
not. The main similarity between the two standards is that both standards are very deferential 
towards the legislative or administrative agencies which promulgate the practices. For a more 
complete discussion of "rational educational basis" see infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text. 
For a more complete discussion of the traditional rational basis test see infra notes 16-23 and 
accompanying text. 
11. Education creates a unique backdrop for substantive due process challenges because of 
the unique nature of education. This helps explain why courts are developing new standards of 
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courts are presently using when examining substantive due process in 
education cases. Finally, part III looks at substantive due process chal-
lenges in the context of judicial intrusion into educational practices. 
I. TRADITIONAL SuBSTANTIVE DuE PRocEss AND EDUCATION 
Almost since the nation began, the Justices of the Supreme Court 
have suggested that the Court has an inherent right to review the sub-
stance of legislation and state action of Congress, state legislatures, or 
administrative agencies. 12 The belief that the judiciary has a right to 
review the substance of legislation and administrative practices springs 
from the pre-revolutionary war philosophers who espoused the position 
that certain natural rights prevailed for all men and that a governmen-
tal body could not limit or impair those rights. 13 
The constitutional provision most used to review the substance of 
legislation is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.14 
However, judicial examination of the substantive aspects of legislation 
and administrative practices has often met with a storm of opposition. 
"In no part of constitutional law has the search for legitimate ingredi-
ents of constitutional interpretation been more difficult and more con-
troversial than in the turbulent history of substantive due process."111 
A. Standard of Review for Substantive Due Process 
After the Supreme Court decision in Nebbia v. New York,l 6 the 
use of substantive due process was discredited. 17 In recent years, how-
review for dealing with such challenges. For a more complete discussion of the unique nature of 
education see infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
12. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In Calder, the Court held that the 
Connecticut legislature had not violated the Constitution when it set aside a probate decree. How-
ever, Justice Chase believed that the drafters of the constitutions of the federal and state govern-
ments intended to create governments of limited powers, and that natural law, as well as the 
specific provisions of written constitutions, restricted and regulated governmental power. See id. at 
386-388. Therefore Justice Chase decided that the proper role of the Supreme Court was to inval-
idate legislation if the justices believed that it interfered with rights vested in the people. 
13. ]. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA, ]. YouNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: HoRNBOOK SERIES -
STUDENT Eo. 425 (2d ed. 1983 ). 
14. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law .... " U.S. CoNST. amend XIV, § 1. 
15. G. GuNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 441 (lith ed. 1985). 
16. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
17. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining the constitutional-
ity of Washington state's minimum wage law for women over the plaintifrs allegation that the law 
violated substantive due process); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) 
(upholding legislation which prohibited the interstate shipment of "filled milk" by stating that the 
statute must be sustained if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed 
supports the legislation); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (stating that the 
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ever, the use of substantive due process has flourished as a haven for 
the protection of fundamental values. 18 Because the Supreme Court has 
applied two different standards of review in substantive due process 
cases a dichotomy in analysis exists. Generally, the Court merely re-
quires that there be a rational relation between the statute and a legiti-
mate state objective. 19 However, where the Court finds that a funda-
mental right is impaired by a statute or practice, the Court has applied 
a scrutiny that is stricter in two respects. First, the state's objective 
must be compelling, not merely legitimate, and second, the relation be-
tween that objective and the means must be very close, so that the 
means can be said to be necessary to achieve the end.20 These two stan-
dards of review are the two classic standards under substantive due 
process analysis. The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated any 
other standards for substantive due process cases. 21 
Court will not only presume that a legislature has a reasonable basis for enacting a particular 
economic measure, but the Court will hypothesize reasons for the law's enactment if the legisla-
ture fails to state explicitly the reasons behind its judgment). 
From the decisions in Parrish, Carotene Products and Lee Optical, it is clear that the Su-
preme Court will not closely scrutinize legislative or administrative acts under substantive due 
process theories if the rights involved are subject to regulation under the police powers of the state. 
In fact, the Court's deference to the state in these matters is so great that even if the legislature 
does not find a legitimate state interest on which to premise its regulations, the Court will hypoth-
esize such an interest. 
18. See, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that several general constitu-
tional theories combined to create a zone of constitutionally protected privacy which required a 
compelling state interest and a closely tailored statute before the fundamental right of privacy 
could be regulated by the state); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a Texas anti-
abortion statute on the grounds that the statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment as an unjustified deprivation of liberty in that it unnecessarily infringed on a woman's 
right to privacy). See also Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical 
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Epstein, Substantive Due 
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. C'r. REv. 159. 
The genesis of the special protection for fundamental rights may be traced to the now famous 
footnote 4 in Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4, where Justice Stone, after finding no 
substantive due process protection for an economic right, left the question open concerning 
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." /d. 
19. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("[A] state is free to adopt whatever 
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare.") (emphasis added); 
Carotene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 ("[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment 
is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless ... it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that 
it rests on some rational basis . ... ")(emphasis added); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-
32 (1963) ("[W]e refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation' . .") 
(footnotes omitted). 
20. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). 
21. The two standards of substantive due process analysis can be contrasted with the several 
standards which the Supreme Court uses in Equal Protection analysis. In analyzing economic 
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In short, the classic substantive due process analysis involves just 
two standards of review - strict judicial scrutiny under the compelling 
state interest test and minimal judicial scrutiny under rational basis 
analysis. In practice this means that absent a fundamental right, legis-
lators and administrators enjoy great deference, but if a fundamental 
right is found, any infringement on that right is rarely justified.22 
In theory, if the classic substantive due process analysis were ap-
plied to an educational practice, the analysis would involve two steps. 
First, the court would determine whether the educational practice in 
question involved a fundamental right. Second, the court would apply 
the appropriate standard of review. If the practice in question were 
found to involve a fundamental right, the standard of review would be 
the compelling state interest test with strict judicial scrutiny. However, 
if the practice did not infringe on a fundamental right, the rational 
basis test would be used with minimal judicial scrutiny. Under a ra-
tional basis test, little analysis of the content of the educational practice 
would be necessary because the court would merely need to analyze 
whether the practice was rationally based on a legitimate state interest. 
In reality, however, neither of these approaches are currently be-
ing used by most courts for decisions in educational cases.23 A partial 
reason for a different standard of review in cases involving substantive 
due process challenges to educational practices is found in the nature of 
education. 
regulation cases under equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court uses a rational basis stan-
dard. E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (As long as the 
classification scheme "has relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the 
kind of discrimination against which the equal protection clause affords protection" the Court will 
sustain the regulation against arguments based on equal protection.). Where the classification 
scheme of the questioned regulation involves a suspect classification, the Court will use strict judi-
cial scrutiny. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Korematsu is a Japanese 
internment case where the Court first identified the different standard of review which applied to 
classifications according to "suspect categories." 
The rational basis and strict judicial scrutiny standards are not the only standards of review 
which the Court has used in equal protection analysis. In cases of gender based classifications, the 
Court has held that strict judicial scrutiny is not appropriate, but that an intermediate level of 
review is. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Classifications based on alienage and illegitimacy 
also have somewhat heightened review, although not rising to the level of strict judicial scrutiny. 
See, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
The willingness of the Supreme Court to engage in intermediate levels of review in equal 
protection analysis may be part of the reason why lower courts are beginning to stretch substantive 
due process analysis from the two rigid categories. 
22. See GuNTHER, supra note 15, at 454 ("It is only when the 'liberty' allegedly infringed is 
thought to be 'fundamental' deserving of special protection, and thus imposing on the state espe-
cially high burdens of justification for the infringement, that due process turns into an interven-
tionist tool.") 
23. See supra note I 0 and accompanying text on the distinction of a "rational educational 
basis" test from traditional rational basis. See generally infra Part II. 
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B. The Unique Nature of Education and Its Effect on judicial 
Review 
Under a classic substantive due process analysis, the nature of the 
challenged educational practice would be the key in determining which 
standard of review should be applied. However, the unique nature of 
education makes it ill-suited for either traditional standard of substan-
tive due process analysis. While there is no provision in the U.S. Con-
stitution for public or private education, education is almost universally 
thought of as a value fundamental to American society. This is evi-
denced by the fact that almost every state constitution recognizes educa-
tional institutions or educational rights. 24 While the Supreme Court has 
held that public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the 
Constitution,211 the Court has also stated: 
[N]either is [education] merely some governmental 'benefit' indistin-
guishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the im-
portance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the 
lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the 
distinction .... [E]ducation provides the basic tools by which individ-
uals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. 
In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of 
our society. 26 
In short, while there is no explicit mention in the Constitution of 
education as a fundamental right, the fundamental importance of edu-
cation cannot be denied. Thus, courts have refused to grant education a 
fundamental right status, or to relegate it to a lower classification. As a 
result, an anomaly exists in substantive due process challenges to edu-
cational practices. Courts are pulled toward strict scrutiny by the es-
teemed value of education, but they are also pulled toward a deferential 
review because education has not been granted a fundamental right sta-
tus by the Constitution or by the Supreme Court. The tension between 
the need for scrutiny and the need for deference has created a paradox 
in substantive due process review. This paradox is discussed in the next 
section.27 
24. The legal importance of education is revealed by the fact that forty-eight of the 50 
states have state constitutional provisions requiring that the state legislature create a 
system of public education. On the other hand, only one state (New York) has a consti-
tutional provision requiring that the state provide a service other than education 
(welfare). 
A. MoRRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 59 (2nd ed. 1980). See also infra 
text accompanying notes 41-42. 
25. San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
26. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
27. For many of the issues involved in judicial intrusion into education see infra Part III. 
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II. FEDERAL SuBSTANTIVE DuE PRocEss IN AcADEMIA 
Substantive due process challenges to laws and regulations often 
meet with great resistance and controversy. For example, educators, 
legislators, and police officers do not appreciate judges who "second-
guess" their decisions, laws, and policies in the name of substantive due 
process. In the case of education, the Supreme Court has recognized 
these fears by endorsing a deferential approach to the decisions made 
by educational administrators.28 
Recently, however, plaintiffs in education cases have asked the 
courts to give greater substantive due process protection to various 
rights inherent in education.29 Before 1965 when Griswold v. Connecti-
cut30 was decided, there had been only three substantive due process 
challenges to educational practices. 31 Pre-Griswold education cases in-
volved more traditional constitutional rights such as first amendment 
rights. 32 Since 1965, there has been an explosion of substantive due 
process cases challenging educational practices. 33 These challenges are 
28. See Ewing, 106 S. Ct. at 514. 
29. See infra note 33. 
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold is a watershed point in the development of the doctrine of 
substantive due process because it was one of the first cases in which the Court clearly identified a 
non-economic right, privacy, which was not in the Constitution, but deserved constitutional protec-
tion. Most commentators agree that Griswold opened up a new area of substantive due process. 
See GUNTHER, supra note 15, at 503-16. 
31. Elbrandt v. Russell, 381 P.2d 554, 94 Ariz. I (1963) (challenging the validity of loyalty 
oaths which teachers were required to sign); Jones v. Board of Control, 131 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 
1961) (alleging a breach of contract for terminating a teacher's employment because the teacher 
filed as a candidate for a judgeship); Board of Public Educ. School Dist. v. Intelle, 163 A.2d 420, 
401 Pa. I (1960) (challenging a teacher's dismissal for incompetence). 
32. E.g., Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923). Justice Douglas explained Meyer as enforcing "peripheral rights" stemming from the 
First Amendment. 
The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice - whether public or 
private or parochial - is also not mentioned [in the Constitution]. Nor is the right to 
study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has 
been construed to include certain of those rights. By [Pierce], the right to educate one's 
children as one chooses is made applicable to the States. [By Meyer], the same dignity is 
given the right to study the German language. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
33. For example, in Mermer v. Constantine, 131 A.D.2d 28, 520 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1987), fol-
lowing a classroom evaluation conducted by a school district consultant, a teacher was advised that 
he must visit a dentist to improve the appearance of his teeth. When he refused, he was termi-
nated. The teacher brought an action based on a substantive due process claim. The court found 
that the complaint failed to establish that the defendant's conduct infringed upon a protected inter-
est and therefore, no denial of substantive due process existed. In Fiscus v. Board of School Trust-
ees of Central School Dist., 509 N.E.2d 1137 (Ind.App. 1987), a teacher brought action against 
school board alleging a denial of substantive due process in her termination for uttering an "im-
moral" remark in a fifth-grade classroom. The court found no right it could protect. In Dean v. 
Tensas Parish School Board, 505 So.2d 908 (La.App. 1987), a former school supervisor brought 
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often accompanied by a storm of opposition because of the potential for 
judicial intrusion into education. 
Education administrators are especially vehement in their concern 
over instances of judicial intervention in what they perceive as "their 
business." Educators often find that "nowhere is 'their business' more 
'their business' than in policies and decisions about grades, program 
completion, and diplomas."3" Substantive due process challenges pose 
an especially significant threat of judicial intrusion because substantive 
due process analysis goes to the substance of the educational decisions, 
not just the procedure of those decisions as does procedural due process 
analysis. 
A. Procedural Due Process in Education as Opposed to Substantive 
Due Process 
For the most part, federal courts have left the "educator's busi-
ness" to the educator by refusing to grant substantive due process chal-
lenges to educational decisions. However, the courts are still willing to 
review educational administrative decisions on procedural due process 
grounds. In Goss v. Lopez, 311 the Supreme Court held that students had 
a property right in their continued enrollment in school. Therefore, ac-
cording to the Court's logic, students have a constitutional right not to 
be suspended for misbehavior unless they are first afforded procedural 
due process rights - the right to be informed of the reason for the 
proposed suspension, and the right to a hearing. 36 
Goss and similar cases37 are intended to protect students from pro-
cedural forms of abuse. These cases applied procedural due process 
standards to school disciplinary procedures, but at a level so minimal 
that these cases "stand primarily for the Court's unwillingness to con-
an action claiming denial of substantive due process for his dismissal without a hearing or an 
opportunity to rebut the charges. The court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Carley v. Ari-
zona Bd. of Regents, 153 Ariz. 461, 737 P.2d 1099 (Ariz.App. 1987) involved an art teacher at a 
college who brought an action alleging substantive due process violations and denial of academic 
freedom because of his dismissal. The court rejected the claims and upheld the university presi-
dent's decision not to rehire the plaintiff. See also North v. Iowa, 400 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1987); 
Linderkamp v. Bismark School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1986); Sheridan Rd. Baptist 
Church v. Department of Educ., 426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W.2d 373 (1986); Pace v. Hymas, 111 
Idaho 581, 726 P.2d 693 (1986); Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1976). 
See generally supra note 3. 
34. Strope, Substantive Due Process in Academia: Board of Curators v. Horowitz - Seven 
Years Later, 28 WEST's Eouc. L. REP., 983, 993 (1986). Strope contends that only two types of 
substantive due process cases will succeed. Those types of cases involve actions by school adminis-
trators which are taken in bad-faith, or purely arbitrary and capricious actions. 
35.419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
36. See id. at 5 79-81. 
37. This line of cases began with In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). 
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elude that due process has no application at all to schools."38 For exam-
ple, in Goss the Court recognized the unusual character of the school 
environment by leaving discretion with school officials to define the 
level of procedural formality required. "In that sense, school personnel 
are not treated as other state agents, nor does procedural due process 
have the same meaning in school cases that it does elsewhere."38 Ac-
cordingly, the educational setting is sufficiently unique to justify a 
unique set of procedural requirements, although the educational setting 
alone does not confer independent fundamental rights or liberty 
interests. 40 
One reason for the minimal level of procedural guarantees in edu-
cation cases is the unique nature of education. Schools are to provide 
more than a service; their mandate is to educate their pupils. Neverthe-
less, it would be difficult for a court to mandate the level of education a 
school must provide because the effectiveness of education inevitably de-
pends on willingness and cooperation from the student. For example, a 
court is more likely to review the procedure used in dismissing a child 
from a public school, than it is to review the quality of that child's 
education . .u "[W]hile children clearly have the right to be educated, 
their right is not susceptible of total enforcement, because enforcement 
depends so heavily upon the fulfillment of affirmative duties by schools 
that are beyond the capacity of courts to supervise in productive, spe-
cific ways."'2 
1. Academic freedom of educational institutions 
The Supreme Court has recognized that an educational institution 
has "essential freedoms" to "determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who 
may be admitted to study."43 This is known as the doctrine of academic 
freedom." In many ways academic freedom is a counter argument to 
38. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools 
as Mediating Structures 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 689 (1987). 
39. Id. at 694. 
40. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). 
41. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. 
Rptr 854 (1976) In Peter W., the plaintiff sued the school district for failing to educate him 
adequately. The plaintiff claimed that the school was negligent as evidenced by the fact that he 
couldn't read a level higher than the 6th grade. /d. 
42. Hafen, supra note 38, at 711. 
43. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting, 
The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12). This language was not in the majority opinion, but 
Justice Powell relied on it in his controlling opinion in University of Cal.. Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
44. See MoRRIS, supra note 24, at 238. 
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the substantive due process argument. Under academic freedom, the 
school feels that it has a right to teach and administer policies as it sees 
fit. On the other hand, under substantive due process, the plaintiffs in 
educational cases argue that they have a fundamental right to a certain 
type of education and school policies and that teachings must be consis-
tent with that fundamental right. 
In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, a unanimous Su-
preme Court relied on the concept of academic freedom when it upheld 
the University of Michigan's dismissal of a student for academic rea-
sons.'11 The action involved the judgment of a university faculty com-
mittee regarding the academic qualifications of a student.'6 Rejecting 
the student's claim that the University had misjudged his fitness for 
continued enrollment, the Court refused to override the "faculty's pro-
fessional judgment" unless "it is such a substantial departure from ac-
cepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee 
responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment."" Noting 
that "considerations of profound importance counsel restrained judicial 
review of the substance of academic decisions," Justice Stevens, writing 
for the majority, found the judiciary unsuitable to "evaluate the sub-
stance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by 
faculty members of public educational institutions." Justice Stevens 
went on to state: "Academic freedom thrives ... somewhat inconsis-
tently, on autonomous decision making by the academy itself."'8 
Ewing reaffirmed an earlier decision in Board of Curators v. 
Horowitz, ' 9 where the Supreme Court showed a strong preference for 
deferring to the discretionary judgment of school leaders in the subjec-
tive evaluations of academic competence. Because the Court is reluctant 
to second-guess academic judgment calls of university faculty, 110 educa-
tional institutions enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from judicial 
review. 
45. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1985). 
46. The student had completed four years of a six-year program, but failed a national quali-
fying test after having barely completed his other requirements. /d. at 508-09. His suit alleged 
arbitrary and capricious action by the University in violation of his substantive due process right 
to continued enrollment, noting that he was the only student to fail the test who had not been 
permitted to retake it. /d. 
47. /d. at 513. The board's judgment was found "not beyond the pale of reasoned academic 
decision-making" in light of the student's entire university career. /d. at 515. 
48. /d. at 513. 
49. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
50. See e.g. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1978) ("Even assuming that 
the courts can review under such a [substantive due process J standard an academic decision of a 
public educational institution, we agree with the District Court that no showing of arbitrariness or 
capriciousness has been made in this case. Courts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate aca-
demic performance.") (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). 
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2. Restriction on autonomy of educational institutions 
The concept of educational autonomy found in Ewing and 
Horowitz" 1 does not give educational institutions total autonomy."2 Dis-
cretionary core educational decisions,"8 are likely to be upheld upon 
judicial review, but where non-academic decisions are involved, the dis-
cretion of educators meets with more scrutiny. The procedures used to 
implement those decisions, therefore, must meet minimum procedural 
due process standards and cannot offend other constitutional guaran-
tees. For example, "student discipline for non-academic infractions may 
be sufficiently removed from core academic activity to call for greater 
due process protections than would be appropriate in evaluations of ac-
ademic performance."11" The distinction between discretion in core edu-
cational decisions and discretion in administrative non-academic proce-
dures helps explain why the Supreme Court is less willing to sustain 
broad institutional autonomy in behavioral discipline cases than it is in 
decisions about academic curriculum. 1111 
B. Current Substantive Due Process of Educational Practices 
Between Horowitz and Ewing, it is evident that the Court will 
give great deference to educational practices which involve core educa-
tional discretion. However, from examining the recent challenges to 
educational practices, it is these discretionary educational policy deci-
sions which are most likely to be attacked on substantive due process 
grounds. 116 Despite the fact the Supreme Court generally advocates def-
erence to educational policy makers, the analysis which the Court has 
51. In Horowitz, the Court rejected a challenge by a medical student that her termination as 
a student violated substantive due process. Prior to her termination, she had received several poor 
progress reports and failed a supervised test. However, she claimed that her dismissal was arbi-
trary and that the procedures followed were unfair. The Court held only a minimal hearing was 
required and that determinations regarding student status by educational administrators should be 
given great deference. Id. at 92. 
52. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom, 
Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982). See also Finkin, On "Institutional Academic 
Freedom," 61 TEx. L. REv. 817, 825 (1983). 
53. Core educational decisions include curriculum matters, teacher evaluations, graduation 
requirements, academic performance, academic advancement, etc. 
54. Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual 
Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1675 (1986). 
55. See Hafen, supra note 38, at 722. Compare New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) 
and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) with Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
56. See supra note 33 for a listing of many cases involving discretionary decisions which 
were challenged under substantive due process. See also infra text accompanying notes 69-77. 
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used in its recent substantive due process decisions is slightly less defer-
ential than the traditional rational basis test. 117 
1. Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a different standard 
of review exists in education cases 
As stated earlier, the majority of the Court has assumed, but not 
explicitly decided, that there is a right to review educational practices 
under substantive due process. 118 In Ewing, for example, the Court ac-
cepts at face value the student's contention that he has a property inter-
est in his continued education that is protected by the due process 
clause in the fourteenth amendment. 119 The Court then proceeds to ana-
lyze this interest and finds that no unconstitutional infringement of his 
interest has occurred because the University's decision to terminate his 
affiliation with the school was not arbitrary.60 It is evident from the 
decision that the Court used some form of substantive due process re-
view in evaluating the student's interest; however, the standard of re-
view used by the Court is unclear. The Court, most certainly did not 
use the same analysis as in a fundamental rights case, i.e. compelling 
state interest coupled with a closely tailored means.61 However, the 
Court's language is also not consistent with traditional rational basis 
analysis62 because the Court considered the substantive aspects of the 
57. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (where the Court pre-
sumed the validity of a legislative enactment and even went so far as to hypothesize a rational 
basis for the enactment) with Ewing, 106 S.Ct. 507 (1985) (where the Court assumed that a 
substantive due process analysis into an education case involved an inquiry into the fundamental 
fairness of the practice and decided whether the policy was carried out in a manner that was 
arbitrary and capricious). 
58. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
59. Ewing, 106 S.Ct. at 512. 
60. Id. at 511-13. 
61. This is quite evident from the sort of relief the student in Ewing was seeking. In Ewing, 
the student wa5 merely seeking the right to retake a standardized test which he failed the first 
time. Id. at 509. The University had usually allowed students to retake that test, but had denied 
Ewing this opportunity. Ewing claimed this denial was arbitrary. Id. If the Court had found that 
Ewing had a fundamental right to continued enrollment, it is most probable that the Court would 
not have found the state's interest in regulating it's program sufficient enough to deny Ewing the 
opportunity to retake the test, especially in light of the fact that the University had allowed several 
other students the right to retake the test. See id. at 512. 
62. The Court assumed a protected property right in the education. Ewing, 106 S.Ct. at 512. 
Then the Court examined whether or not the procedures employed by the University in denying 
Ewing a chance to retake the test were fair. Id. at 513. Finally, the Court considered the substan-
tive aspects of the University's policy. ld. at 513-14. 
Under traditional rational basis, the Court would have looked to find a legitimate state inter-
est and whether the procedure used was rationally related to that interest. By examining the 
fairness of the University's action and the substantive aspects of the University's policy, the Court 
is giving much closer scrutiny to the challenged practice than a mere rational basis analysis would 
require. 
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University's actions for fairness, not just whether the actions were ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest. 
Justice Powell felt that this increased scrutiny was alarming and 
wrote a concurring opinion merely to decry any form of substantive due 
process analysis which expands the standard of review.83 He noted that 
no substantive due process protection should be asserted until the Court 
has been "careful to examine each asserted interest to determine 
whether it 'merits' the protection of substantive due process."8 " Even 
though he agreed with the result reached by the Court, Justice Powell 
feared that the analysis used by the Court gave Ewing significant sub-
stantive due process protection without examining the nature of the in-
terest asserted by Ewing.8~ This fear prompted Powell to write sepa-
rately to deny that educational interests deserved any greater 
substantive due process protection than other non-fundamental 
interests. 
In Horowitz, the Supreme Court made the assumption that a 
slightly different standard of review exists for substantive due process 
in education cases.88 Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, noted 
that "a number of lower courts have implied in dictum that academic 
dismissals from state institutions can be enjoined if 'shown to be clearly 
arbitrary or capricious.' "87 Justice Rehnquist then analyzed the rights 
involved assuming that a standard of review based on a showing of 
arbitrariness or capriciousness existed. He found that the action in-
volved was not arbitrary or capricious. 88 
The Horowitz opinion does not make it clear whether a standard 
which looks at arbitrariness or capriciousness is different from the ra-
tional basis test used in other substantive due process cases. It is argua-
ble that the arbitrary or capricious standard is a higher standard than 
the rational basis test. To determine whether an action is arbitrary or 
capricious, the court looks to the substance of the action, not just to the 
rational relation to a legitimate goal. Such an inquiry becomes very fact 
sensitive because fundamental fairness could mean different things in 
different situations or even to different interested parties. Additionally, 
63. "[S]ubstantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution .... The determi-
nation that a substantive due process right exists is a judgment that certain interests require par-
ticularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment." /d. at 515 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring). 
64. /d. (Powell, J., concurring) (citing More v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
65. /d. 
66. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 433 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1978). 
67. /d. (citing Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1976); Gaspar v. 
Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (lOth Cir. 1975); and citations therein). 
68. /d. 
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an action may be found to be rationally related to a legitimate state 
goal but still be arbitrary or capricious. 
2. Lower courts are adopting a "rational educational basis" test 
which is more searching than rational basis 
As stated in the introduction, this article argues that the lower 
courts are using a standard of review which examines the nature of the 
challenged educational practice and not just its rational relationship to 
a legitimate state interest. This standard may be termed a "rational 
educational basis" standard because the courts are still very deferential 
to educational policy-makers and only require a rational educational 
goal. This new standard looks at questions of fundamental fairness, ar-
bitrariness, and capriciousness. However, even under this new stan-
dard, the presumption is that the questioned educational practice does 
have a rational educational basis and is therefore constitutional. 
Justice Rehnquist seemed to support this notion when he noted in 
Horowitz that lower courts are beginning to adopt different standards 
of review in education cases where a substantive due process challenge 
exists.69 Even though the vast majority of substantive due process chal-
lenges to educational practices have not succeeded because the courts 
defer to the educational practice, the lower courts are increasingly will-
ing to examine the substantive nature of the academic and daily deci-
sions made by educational institutions. 
An example of a more intense judicial scrutiny of the substance of 
an educational administrative decision can be seen in Pace v. Hymas.70 
In this case, a junior college terminated an entire program, including a 
faculty position in the program.71 The teacher who was terminated 
with the program, sued the college claiming she had a constitutionally 
protected interest in her job under the doctrine of substantive due pro-
69. See Mahavongsanan, 529 F.2d at 449; Gaspar, 513 F.2d at 850. See also supra note 33 
and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 70-77. 
The arbitrary and capricious standard is also being considered in other areas of constitutional 
law which are analogous to education cases. In "takings" jurisprudence, for example, many courts 
have looked at whether a finding of arbitrary or capricious conduct in the denial of a building 
permit is sufficient grounds to support a due process challenge. See Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 
F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1986) ("This circuit has not previously considered whether an arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal denial of a building permit states a substantive due process claim under § 
1983. A number of other circuits have considered this question and all but the First Circuit gener-
ally recognize such claims."). 
70. Ill Idaho 581, 726 P.2d 693 (1986). 
71. The plaintiff in this case was the only teacher terminated when the program was termi-
nated even though she had tenure and she was the most experienced teacher in the program. The 
plaintiff was 54 years old and could have retired with full benefits with only one more year of 
service. /d. at 582, 726 P.2d 693, 94 (1986). 
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cess. The court examined more than the manner in which the teacher 
was terminated; the court examined the reason behind the termination 
of the program.72 It was alleged that the program was terminated be-
cause of severe budgetary reductions. The court found that a sufficient 
"financial exigency" was not proven, thus the school was not justified 
in terminating the teacher's job. Moreover, it is not clear whether the 
school could have terminated the program for reasons other than finan-
cial exigencies without also violating the teacher's substantive due pro-
cess protection in her job. Because the court went into such detailed 
analysis of the substance of the school's action, it is doubtful that the 
court would accept many of the possible state reasons for depriving this 
teacher of her job. It is evident that the standard of review employed by 
the court was higher than a mere rational basis test. 
Another example of a court carefully analyzing the substance of an 
educational decision is Mermer v. Constantine.73 In Mermer, a teacher 
was dismissed because he refused to comply with a direction to visit a 
dentist to have his disfigured teeth fixed. The Mermer court went into 
great detail in analyzing the substance of the school agency's action to 
determine whether it was fundamentally fair. While the Mermer court 
found that the school's action was not violative of substantive due pro-
cess, as in Pace, the reasons given were very fact specific. The court 
carefully examined many different aspects of the school board's action 
to determine the fundamental fairness of that action. This sort of fact 
specific review is a higher level of scrutiny than that which normally 
applies to substantive due process cases, but this level of review is quite 
prevalent in educational substantive due process cases. 
Substantive due process challenges to educational practices do not 
always fail. Evans v. West Virginia Board of Regents74 is an example 
of a standard of review, different from the rational basis standard, used 
to uphold a challenge to an educational decision. In Evans, the plaintiff 
was a student at the West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine 
(WVSOM). After he completed two-and-a-half years of school with a 
B average, he contracted a serious infection which required him to 
withdraw from school. He sought and obtained a year leave from 
school, but he remained absent from school for a year and two months. 
When he returned to school, he was informed that he would have to 
reapply for admission. After he reapplied, WVSOM rejected his appli-
cation without giving any indication why. After review, the West Vir-
72. /d. 
73. 131 A.D.2d 28, 520 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1987). 
74. 271 S.E.2d 778 (W.Va. 1980). 
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ginia Board of Regents dismissed his case. He then sued in state court 
claiming a denial of substantive due process rights. 711 
The West Virginia Court agreed that Mr. Evans was denied sub-
stantive due process and reinstated Evans in school. Significantly, the 
court did not just require a hearing by the educational institution, but 
instead, the court reinstated the student. In so doing, the court found 
that Evans had a protected interest in continued enrollment at WV-
SOM and that interest could not be taken away by what it found to be 
an arbitrary action. This intrusive review by the state court sharply 
contrasts the mandates in Horowitz and Ewing. In those cases, as ex-
plained above,78 the Supreme Court held that only minimal procedural 
guarantees were needed to dismiss a student, clearly giving great defer-
ence to school administrators. In Evans, however, the state court gave 
only limited deference to school administrators and ordered the rein-
statement of Mr. Evans contrary to the decision of the educational 
authorities. 
If the Evans court had applied a mere rational basis test, it is most 
likely that the challenged school action would have been upheld. The 
school arguably has an interest in maintaining an orderly program 
which includes regulating the beginning and ending dates of the pro-
gram. Furthermore, the school has an interest in ensuring that classes 
will not be disrupted by students entering in the middle of the year. 
These interests give the school sufficient justification for controlling a 
leave of absence from the school and enforcing deadlines for returning 
from a leave of absence. If a rational basis test truly had been followed, 
the court should have found that the decision not to readmit Evans to 
school, after missing a deadline for returning, was rationally related to 
maintaining the academic integrity of the school's programs. However, 
the court focused more on the arbitrary nature of the school's decision 
not to readmit Evans, rather than deferring to the school's administra-
tive decision. 
From the decisions in Evans, Mermer, Pace, and numerous other 
lower court decisions in education cases,77 it seems apparent that a 
75. /d. at 780. See also Strope, supra note 34, at 986. 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68. 
77. See cases cited supra note 33. Another example of a slightly higher standard used by a 
court is in the recent case Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1987). In Honore, a law 
school professor brought a substantive due process challenge against the law school because he was 
refused tenure. The trial court granted a summary judgment against the professor because it found 
that Honore's arguments did not create a genuine issue of material fact. The 5th Circuit reversed 
because it concluded that a showing of arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the school's 
administration would be sufficient to support a substantive due process challenge, and that there 
existed issues of fact of whether there was arbitrary or capricious conduct. /d. at 568-69. Signifi-
cantly, the Honore opinion cites Justice Stevens opinion in Ewing for the authority that a showing 
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standard of review exists which is different from the traditional rational 
basis test. This new standard is not nearly as strict as the standard 
involved in fundamental right cases, but it is less deferential than the 
traditional rational basis test because it looks at the nature or fairness 
of educational practice in question. The new standard, however, still 
gives deference to educational administrators because most courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, are still careful to give educators great def-
erence when a rational educational policy is found. 
This great deference given to school administrators is why this 
new standard of review may be termed a "rational educational basis" 
test. While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that lower courts are 
using alternate standards of review, the Court has expressly withheld 
deciding the validity of these standards. It is unclear just how strict this 
standard is, or what the appropriate test under this standard should be. 
Most lower courts accept a notion that educational practices should be 
checked against a standard of arbitrariness and capriciousness. How-
ever, such a review is inherently fact sensitive and no clear guidelines 
have been established defining arbitrariness. The reason for concern 
over the standard of review can be traced to the argument over judicial 
intrusion into educational practices, the higher the standard of review 
- the more the judicial intrusion into education. 
III. jUDICIAL INTRUSION INTO EDUCATION 
When considering the question of substantive due process chal-
lenges to educational practices, the general topic of judicial intrusion is 
very important. Many commentators argue that courts should "pre-
sume the constitutional validity of rational decisions" of public educa-
tion administrators, whether those activities are in curricular or extra-
curricular areas.78 Traditionally, courts have made this presumption 
and assumed that daily actions of school administrators are constitu-
tional. However, this deference has not been absolute. Often, courts 
have stepped in to protect the individual rights of students. In Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District,79 the Court held 
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."80 Pierce v. Society of Sis-
of arbitrary or capricious conduct is sufficient to sustain a substantive due process challenge to an 
educational practice. /d. Thus, the Honoroe court required more than a mere showing of a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate state interest before it would dismiss a substantive due process 
challenge to an educational practice. 
78. Hafen, supra note 38, at 664. 
79. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
80. /d. at 506. 
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ters,81 and Wisconsin v. Yoder82 exemplify the U.S. Supreme Court's 
willingness to overturn state laws or policies which govern the conduct 
of education if those laws or practices infringe on protected constitu-
tional rights. In Pierce and Yoder, the Court found the individual 
rights at stake outweighed the state's interests. In these cases, the Su-
preme Court found an independent fundamental right that counter-bal-
anced the state interest in education.83 The Court predicated its intru-
sion into educational practices on traditional consitutional rights such 
as the rights protected by the first amendment.84 
Despite the judicial activity in the area of individual rights,8 & 
courts still give great deference to educational administrators.86 This is 
81. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a compulsory attendance law which required children 
to attend only public schools violated the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
82. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court held that a compulsory education law which 
required Amish children to attend schools after the 8th grade was unconstitutional. The Amish 
religion believed in avoiding worldly influences and in remaining on farms. The Court found that 
the Amish children received a sufficiently equivalent education by the 8th grade and that the 
state's interest in requiring further education was not outweighed by the burden placed on the 
Amish religion. See id. at 234-36. 
83. In Pierce, the Court found that the right to direct the upbringing of children by the 
parents was a check against the state's right to control education. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532. 
Therefore, the state could not require that students only attend public schools, but the state did 
have the authority to set minimum guidelines for the academic content of private schools. /d. at 
534. In Yoder, the same notion of the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children 
also was justification for striking down compulsory education laws when equivalent or adequate 
education had been attained by the students. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34. 
Significantly, the Court in both cases recognized the importance of education to American 
society and balanced the needs of the educational administrators against other fundamental rights. 
Implicit in both decisions is the Court's recognition that the state has a right to demand and 
regulate basic education to all citizens and only if equivalent or otherwise adequate education can 
be provided elsewhere, can the parents right in upbringing their children override the state's edu-
cational system. 
84. See Justice Douglas's characterization of the rights in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in supra note 32. Meyer and Pierce 
have been cited for the proposition that parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing 
of their children, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but these cases have not been interpreted 
by the Supreme Court to include a fundamental right of education. See San Antonio Indep. School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). 
85. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is an example of the Supreme 
Court's intrusion on the daily activities of school to protect individual rights. The Court ruled that 
legislated segregation in the school district violated the fourteenth amendment. /d. Through this 
decision, the Court began using the schools as a vehicle to affect social change. 
86. The courts are far less suited "to evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic 
decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions." Regents of 
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1985). See also Board of Curators v. Harowitz, 
433 U.S. 78, 92 (1978); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (reaffirming the Court's 
deference to educational institutions by stating that "public education in our Nation is committed 
to the control of state and local authority," and that federal courts should not ordinarily "intervene 
in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems."); Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (noting that the Court has repeatedly emphasized 
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especially true in areas of curriculum, teacher and student discipline, 
academic performance, and testing procedures. Traditionally, the courts 
have applied only a minimal level of scrutiny to school administrative 
decisions unless a fundamental right was involved.87 
In recent years,88 however, there has been what some school ad-
ministrators consider an explosion of educational law litigation.89 Stu-
dents, parents, special interest groups, and governmental agencies are 
seeking to have the courts impose certain standards on schools. In es-
sence, these groups want the courts to give stricter scrutiny to educa-
tional practices. They want educational interests to be examined as a 
liberty interest or a fundamental right, as are privacy issues.90 
Several reasons have been given for the increase in educational law 
litigation. One reason is that schools have become more influenced by 
governmental control. Another reason is the fight over local control of 
school administrations as opposed to state or federal control. A final 
reason for increased litigation is the increased role schools play in social 
reform. Because of increased governmental control, local control, and 
social reform movements, litigants want the courts to more carefully 
scrutinize the educational practices. 91 
A. Governmental Control in Schools 
In the last few years, educational reform groups have increasingly 
called for education to return to higher academic standards.92 As a re-
sult, education is moving toward a reassertion of authority. As educa-
tion becomes more institutional, it is carrying with it "increasingly 
heavy social and political policies in addition to its more traditional 
burden of teaching."93 During the past two centuries, public education 
"the comprehensive authority of the States and school officials ... to prescribe and control conduct 
in the schools."). 
87. See Hafen, supra note 38, at 688-93. 
88. The years since Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964). See supra note 3; notes 
29-33 and accompanying text. 
89. See E. REUTrER, THE SUPREME COURT'S IMPACT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION (1982). 
90. The right to privacy is a fundamental right deserving strict scrutiny. See Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 348 U.S. 483 (1973). 
91. In Ewing, the student brought a suit challenging the administration of and policies sur-
rounding a standardized test imposed on medical students at a state university. In San Antonio 
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the plaintiff asked the Court to scrutinize 
local educational funding schemes. In University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1975), 
the plaintiff challenged racial quotas in admissions to medical schools. These three cases represent 
examples in each of the categories: Governmental control - standardized tests, local control -
local funding, and social reform - racial quotas. 
92. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ExCELLENCE, A NATION AT RISK: THE 
IMPERATIVE foR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983). 
93. See Hafen, supra note 38, at 674. See e.g. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
326 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
in the United States, "despite occasional pauses and diversions, has 
moved in the direction of greater emphasis on governmental control."94 
With the greater emphasis on governmental control, the courts 
have become increasingly sensitive to the protection of individual rights 
against governmental abuse. However, the courts are still reluctant to 
extend strict scrutiny to educational cases unless they also involve fun-
damental rights. If the increased governmental regulation of education 
impinges on a right which the court has previously decided was funda-
mental, then the court will protect that right. 
B. Local Control of Schools 
Another area of tension in educational law is the fight over local 
control of educational decision-making. Local control played a major 
role in the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez. 96 In Rodriguez, the Court held that 
seemingly inequitable funding levels among local school districts within 
a state does not violate the equal protection clause. The plaintiffs in the 
case wanted stricter scrutiny applied to education funding programs. 
The Supreme Court, however, held that a system of local control which 
assured basic education for every child only needed to bear a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.96 
The Court also had to wrestle with the concept of local control in 
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 
v. Pico.97 In Pico, the Supreme Court recognized that local school 
boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs.98 
The Court, nevertheless, determined that a school board cannot remove 
books from a school library for the purpose of prescribing what is "or-
(invalidating not only the segregation policies of school district, but the whole scheme of legislated 
and enforced segregation which was prevalent in much of society, and by so doing, using the 
schools to advance social reform); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969) (recognizing that demonstrations against the U.S. government's policies in official 
settings, such as education, was within the protection of the first amendment). 
94. Hafen, supra note 38, at 671-72. 
95. 411 U.S. I (1973). 
96. In addition to acknowledging that local financial control allows each district the choice of 
devoting "more money to the education of one's children," the Court also noted "the opportunity 
[local control] offers for participation in the decision-making process that determines how these 
local tax dollars will be spent." Moreover, "[p]luralism [which local control encourages] also af-
fords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for education 
excellence." Id. at 50. 
This case actually involved an equal protection argument. However, the Court's refusal to 
give strict scrutiny to an educational funding practice also applies to substantive due process. 
97. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
98. Id. at 863. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
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thodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."99 
The Court recognized that discretion given to school authorities "must 
be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent impera-
tives of the First Amendment."10° From reading the Court's opinion in 
Rodriguez, Pico and Barnette, it is evident that the Court is struggling 
to preserve the local control of school administrative bodies while pro-
tecting individual rights. 
C. Schools as Vehicles of Social Reform 
A final element in the increased tension between individual rights 
and deference to school administrative bodies is the expansive role of 
schools in creating social change. Traditionally, schools were seen as 
substitutes for parents in educating their children. This doctrine, 
known as In-loco-parentis, presupposes a voluntary delegation of au-
thority from parents to school officials. 101 However, in recent years 
schools have become an important vehicle for social and political 
change, and the changes which have been instituted by the schools have 
often been antithetical to the expressed wishes of the parents.102 There-
fore, the fiction that the schools have authority to conduct its business 
because the parents consent to such actions is less viable. 
Because some of the traditional justifications for school action have 
been eroded, courts have been placed in the position to define the roles 
of schools. The expansion of social and welfare services has created 
incentives for challenges to governmental actions that affect the availa-
bility of educational benefits. 103 Social reformers have pressed the 
courts to expand both procedural and substantive due process guaran-
tees to curb "governmental arbitrariness in decision-making" and to 
erect "sufficient procedural hurdles . . . [so] that the costs of govern-
mental action would be so high that the government would refrain from 
taking away some benefit it had granted."104 
99. Pico, 457 U.S. at 270 (quoting, West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943)). 
100. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864. See also, West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
637-38 (1943) (Education is the "reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of 
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes."). 
101. MoRRIS, supra note 24, at 425. 
102. Examples of school actions which were conducted in direct opposition to the wishes of 
many parents include desegregation, busing, and boundary changes in school districts. 
103. See Hafen, supra note 38, at 672-82. 
104. R. MNOOKIN, R. BURT, D. CHAMBERS, M. WAUl, S. SUGARMAN, F. ZIMRING, R. 
SOLOMON, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
471-72 (1985). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 
(1975). 
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In summary, the topic of substantive due process challenges to 
educational practices should be viewed in the context of judicial review 
and the reasons for judicial intervention. Even though courts generally 
give deference to daily educational decisions, the judiciary is increas-
ingly being asked to hear educational cases. As schools become greater 
vehicles for government control and social reform, courts are more will-
ing to give closer scrutiny to educational actions. The pressure towards 
increased judicial activism in education and the trend to heightened 
scrutiny into the substantive aspects of educational decisions seems to 
coincide. The trend to heightened scrutiny in educational cases, how-
ever, is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's directive that defer-
ence be given to rational educational decisions. This tension is most 
likely responsible for the uncertainty in the standard of review which 
should be employed in education cases. 
CoNCLUSION 
In conclusion, as a general rule, substantive due process challenges 
to educational practices do not succeed. However, the standard of re-
view which the courts are presently using to evaluate those substantive 
due process challenges is higher than the traditional rational basis test. 
It is unclear at this point, the degree of scrutiny lower courts will use 
in deciding educational cases. This will be especially true if the Su-
preme Court remains silent on what standard of review should be em-
ployed in substantive due process challenges to educational practices. 
For now, at least, there appears to be a standard which may be termed 
as a "rational educational basis" standard. Under this standard the 
courts are examining the substantive aspects of educational practices, 
but only to the extent of determining whether there is a rational educa-
tional basis for the practice. This standard allows courts to look at the 
fundamental fairness of educational practices in specific instances as 
well as whether the practice is arbitrary or capricious. 
The failure of substantive due process challenges in most educa-
tional cases may be explained by the deference which the judiciary tra-
ditionally gives to educators. Even under a slightly heightened scrutiny 
of the educational practices, courts still are very hesitant to intrude 
upon education except in specific areas and in specific ways. Most 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, are willing to give educators the 
benefit of the doubt if a rational educational practice can be found. 
Presently, procedural due process, academic freedom, and educa-
tional autonomy are the most successful arguments available to plain-
tiffs who challenge educational decision-making. However, because the 
Supreme Court has not clearly enunciated a standard of review for sub-
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stantive due process challenges to educational practices, and because 
lower courts are using a "rational educational basis" standard of re-
view, substantive due process challenges in educational cases will con-
tinue to have uncertain outcomes. If the courts continue to show defer-
ence to educational practices, then not many substantive due process 
challenges will succeed. However, if the courts scrutinize educational 
practices more closely, or if they continue to scrutinize in detail the 
specific facts of the case, it is likely that deference to educational ad-
ministrators will decrease and more substantive due process challenges 
will succeed. 
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